Abstract: In this paper, we examine the extent to which political donations and contributions influence the behavior of legislators. The role money plays in shaping political decisions has been a prominent issue in America for decades. We rely on insights from Public Choice theorists in construing a potential “market for legislation” where special interest groups act as demanders of legislative outcomes and legislators act as suppliers of same. We employ a theoretical framework used to interpret the voting behavior of policymakers within this context. Then, using voting records from the 113th United States Congress (2013-2014) and a variety of statistical proxies to account for the factors expected to influence a legislator’s voting behavior, we develop a number of empirical specifications and find that $1 million in political contributions by special interest groups can increase the likelihood of a legislator voting against a bill by approximately 8 percentage points.
Keywords: political donations, “market for legislation”, policymakers, political contributions.
Title: THE MARKET FOR LEGISLATIVE VOTES: EVIDENCE FROM THE 113TH UNITED STATES CONGRESS
Author: William L. Davis, Brian Towell
International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research
ISSN 2348-3156 (Print), ISSN 2348-3164 (online)
Vol. 11, Issue 1, January 2023 - March 2023
Page No: 215-220
Research Publish Journals
Website: www.researchpublish.com
Published Date: 10-March-2023
